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Abstract—Today, most embedded systems use Dynamic 
Voltage and Frequency Scaling (DVFS) to minimize energy 
consumption and maximize performance. The DVFS technique 
works by regulating the important parameters that govern the 
amount of energy consumed in a system, voltage and 
frequency. For the implementation of this technique, the 
operating system (OS) includes software applications that 
dynamically control a voltage regulator or a frequency 
regulator or both. In this paper, we demonstrate for the first 
time a malicious use of the frequency regulator against a  
TrustZone-enabled System-on-Chip (SoC). We use frequency 
scaling to create a covert channel in a TrustZone-enabled 
heterogeneous SoC. We present three different attacks, the 
first is discreet transmission of sensitive data from the SoC to 
outside, using electromagnetic emission. The second attack is 
the inside-SoC transfer of valuable data from a secure ARM 
core to a non-secure one. The last attack is the inside-SoC 
transfer of data between a non-trusted third party IP 
embedded in the programmable logic part of the SoC and a 
processor core. 
Index Terms— ARM TrustZone, Embedded system 
security, AXI bus, Hardware Trojan, DVFS. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Systems-on-Chip (SoC) are becoming increasingly 
complex as they integrate many functionalities including 
third party IPs, which raises awareness of the need to protect 
the SoC from security failure. Today, one of the significant 
threats facing SoC is the covert channel transmission of 
valuable data. This security attack allows the attacker to 
transfer data between processes that are not authorized by the 
security policy to communicate. In general, a covert channel 
transmission uses an intruder process that transfers valuable 
information to a receiver process that decodes it, and uses it 
for malicious purposes. Many methods to create covert 
channels can be found in the literature, but most use shared 
resources such as cache memory [1]. 
Most modern SoC are equipped with Dynamic Voltage 
and Frequency Scaling (DVFS) capability to reduce power 
consumption and maximize performance. DVFS is a 
framework that makes it possible to change the frequency 
and/or operating voltage of a processor based on system 
performance requirements at a given point in time. The 
framework uses kernel drivers to control the hardware 
frequency and/or voltage regulator. 
In this paper, we demonstrate for the first time a 
malicious use of the frequency regulator against TrustZone-
enabled SoC. 
We present three attacks implemented in the TrustZone-
enabled SoC Xilinx Zynq-7010. All these attacks use 
frequency scaling to enable covert channel transmission. 
We first present the related work in Section 2, followed 
by a description of the threat model in Section 3, the targeted 
platform, the prototype system, and the used protocol in 
Section 4, the three attacks in Section 5. Finally, we conclude 
the paper in Section 6. 
II.  RELATED WORK 
Covert channel attack is a well-known type of security 
attack in SoC. It is generally based on shared resources. Lipp 
et al. [1] presented a covert timing channel using a cache 
shared between two unprivileged processes. The covert 
communication is based on the famous cache attacks 
Evict+Reload, Flush+Reload, and Flush+Flush. The intruder 
process and receiver process use the time access to some 
addresses of a shared library to detect a cache hit or miss. 
This hit and miss is translated into a logical 0 and 1. 
Masti et al. [2] demonstrated a thermal covert channel 
using the thermal sensor included in each processor in a 
multiprocessing platform. In their attack, the intruder process 
uses a core workload to heat the platform, thereby allowing a 
receiver process (core in the same platform) to decode the 
temperature variation as a logical 0 and 1. 
Alagappan et al. [3] demonstrated a covert channel using 
frequency modulation. They used DVFS to transfer sensitive 
data between two cores that share the same clock. In their 
attack, the intruder process uses a core workload to affect the 
CPU frequency, which changes according to the CPU 
frequency governor mode used (performance, powersave, 
userspace, ondemand, conservative). The receiver process 
reads the frequency and translates it into a logical 0 or 1. 
Like in [3], the attacks presented in this paper also use 
frequency modulation to send sensitive data between an 
intruder process and a receiver process. But unlike [3], the 
two processes have different security statuses in a 
TrustZone-enabled SoC. What is more, our attacks use direct 
modification of the register related to the frequency 
regulator. We also present for the first time a new covert 
communication in heterogeneous SoC, which is the 
communication between a hardware IP embedded in a 
programmable logic (FPGA fabric for example) and an 
ARM core. 
 
This work was carried out in the framework of the FUIAAP20-Project 
TEEVA supported by Bpifrance. 
III. THREAT MODEL 
In this paper, the general threat is that two processes 
prohibited from communicating with each other by the 
security policies, want to share information illegitimately. 
The two processes have a different security status in the 
TrustZone-enabled heterogeneous SoC. One secure process 
(intruder process) with access to some critical assets, and one 
non-secure process (receiver process) that is not allowed 
direct access to secure elements because of the memory 
management unit (MMU) rules and TrustZone protection [4]. 
We assume that the intruder process has write permission 
over the shared resource and that the receiver process has 
read permission. 
IV. PROTOTYPE SYSTEM 
For our experiment, we used the Xilinx Zynq-7010 SoC, 
a TrustZone-enabled heterogeneous SoC. The Xilinx Zynq-
7010 is compliant with TrustZone technology but the 
software and hardware implementation of the TrustZone 
security services involves a complex process. Interested 
readers can follow the cost free on-line tutorial [5] on 
designing a TrustZone-enable system with the Xilinx Vivado 
CAD tool. 
Figure 1 shows the prototype system used for the 
experiment. In this prototype, SoC is partitioned into a 
Processing System (in blue in Figure 1), and a 
Programmable Logic (in yellow in Figure 1). The 
Processing System integrates a dual ARM core (Cortex-A9) 
that shares the same clock source (brown dashed line in 
Figure 1). The two cores also share an external memory (in 
white in Figure 1) with the Programmable Logic. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Prototype system with Xilinx Zynq-7010 SoC 
The TrustZone technology helps partition the external 
memory, the Programmable Logic, and the Processing 
System into secure (in green in Figure 1) and non-secure (in 
red in Figure 1) memory. The secure ARM core of the 
Processing System runs a custom trusted operating system 
that is stored in the secure region of the external memory. 
The second ARM core (non-secure) runs a general operating 
system that is stored in the non-secure region of the external 
memory. Both ARM cores share the same clock source from 
the SoC clock controller. The Programmable Logic includes 
a secure IP and non-secure IP. Both IPs have direct access to 
the entire external memory with no control by the ARM 
processor (Purple AXI line in Figure 1). 
In the following Section, we describe the four attacks. To 
exchange data between the intruder process and the receiver, 
the attacks use a simple protocol that starts by sending a 
specific word like 0xAAAAAAAA, followed by the size of 
the data to be transferred, and the data. The transfer finishes 
by sending the same word as at the beginning. Like in the 
related work on covert channels, during the experiment, we 
did not focus on reaching the highest bandwidth. 
V. ATTACKS 
This Section presents four attacks that make use of the 
DVFS covert channel. Figure 2 shows the attack paths of the 
four attacks. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Attack paths 
A. Attack #1 
The first attack is the transfer of sensitive data from the 
secure ARM core to outside SoC using electromagnetic 
emission (purple attack path #1 in Figure 2). In 2015, 
Bossuet et al. [6] demonstrated that the electromagnetic 
channel is a powerful covert channel for discrete 
transmission from a SoC to outside. Nevertheless, in [6] an 
intruder circuit (spy circuit) was added to the design. Unlike 
[6], in the present paper, the attacker does not use an 
additional block for electromagnetic emission because the 
frequency modulation is done by the DVFS system directly. 
The attacker uses an electromagnetic probe and a real-time 
spectrum analyzer to decode the received data, as shown in 
Figure 3.  
 
Fig. 3 Real-time spectral analysis of the electromagnetic leakage of 
secret (or sensitive) data 
The attacker does not need to make an electromagnetic 
map of the studied SoC in order to detect the location of the 
targeted signal, a simple hand sweep is sufficient to reveal 
the position of a strong signal. This is due to the large 
number of wires connected to the manipulated clock source 
in this attack. 
For this attack, the trusted operating system includes a 
malicious code in the driver that controls the frequency 
regulator. The malicious code uses frequency modulation to 
transfer the data, as presented in algorithm 1. This algorithm 
uses the same frequency freq_1 to send a logical 1 and 0, and 
keeps this frequency for a long period of time to send a 
logical 1 Tempo_1, and for a short period to send a logical 0 
Tempo_2. Between sending the two bits, the algorithm 
changes the CPU frequency actuel_CPU_freq to another 
frequency freq_2, and keeps it for a short period, Tempo_3 in 
order to help the attacker distinguish between a logical 1 or 
0. 
Algorithm 1: Frequency modulation 
Input: data_to_transfer 
for i = data_to_transfer_size to 0 do 
if (data_to_transfer[i] = 1) then 
actuel_CPU_freq = freq_1; 
loop for Tempo_1; 
else 
actuel_CPU_freq = freq_1; 
loop for Tempo_2; 
end if; 
actuel_CPU_freq = freq_2; 
loop for Tempo_3; 
end for; 
 
This algorithm has many parameters that affect the size 
of the bandwidth: freq_1, freq_2, Tempo_1, Tempo_2, 
Tempo_3. Figure 4 presents two received data decoding for 
two different set of parameters.  
 
a: freq 1 = 325MHz, freq 2 = 433MHz,  
Tempo 1 = 400, Tempo 2 = 200, Tempo 3 = 200 
 
 
b: freq 1 = 325 MHz, freq 2 = 433 MHz, 
Tempo 1 = 200, Tempo 2 = 100, Tempo 3 = 25 
Fig. 4. Decoding received data, a - bandwidth = 1,42.105 bps, b - 
bandwidth = 3,33.105 bps 
Figure 4 shows the relation between the temporal 
parameters (Tempo_1, Tempo_2, Tempo_3) and the 
bandwidth. Indeed, for high tempo values (Figure 4a), it is 
simple to decode the received data directly on the screen, but 
the bandwidth is smaller. 
B. Attack #2 
The second attack is a transfer of sensitive data from the 
secure ARM core to the non-secure one (black attack path #2 
in Figure 2). In the Xilinx Zynq-7010 SoC, the two ARM 
cores are not well isolated because they are connected to the 
same clock. This attack uses this isolation issue to create a 
covert channel. It uses an intruder process included in the 
frequency regulator driver of the trusted operating system, 
and a receiver process included in the general operating 
system to decode the stolen data. The two processes use a 
direct read and/or write to the register related to the 
manipulated clock.  
The intruder process uses algorithm 2 to transfer data. To 
send a logical 1, the algorithm uses the switch from freq_1 to 
freq_2. To send a logical 0, the algorithm uses the switch 
from freq_2 to freq_1. The algorithm holds the two 
frequencies for a short period of time. The method presented 
in the previous section also works, but if the transferred data 
are too long, th method has a high error ratio, and it is hard to 
synchronize the two cores using it. The method using 
algorithm 2 (rising and falling edge method, if we interpret 
the freq_1 as low level and freq_2 as high level) make it 
possible to reach 6.104 bps in bandwidth and 0% in error 
ratio. 
Algorithm 2: Frequency modulation 
Input: data_to_transfer 
for i = data_to_transfer_size to 0 do 
if (data_to_transfer[i] = 1) then 
actuel_CPU_freq = freq_1; 
loop for Tempo_1; 
actuel_CPU_freq = freq_2; 
loop for Tempo_1; 
else 
actuel_CPU_freq = freq_2; 
loop for Tempo_1; 
actuel_CPU_freq = freq_1; 
loop for Tempo_1; 
end if; 
      end for; 
 
The receiver process uses algorithm 3 to decode the 
received data. At each Tempo_sampling, the code takes a 
sample by directly reading the clock register. If the algorithm 
detects a rising edge, it stores a logical 1 in the stolen data 
array, and if it detects a falling edge, it stores a logical 0 in 
the array. The choice of the sampling time Tempo_sampling 
is crucial to not miss any information. It should be smaller 
than the tempo Tempo_1 used in the intruder process. 
C. Attack #3 and #4 
This section presents two attacks, one is a covert 
communication from the secure ARM core to the non-secure 
block IP (blue attack path #3 Figure 2), and one is a covert 
communication from the secure IP to the non-secure ARM 
core (brown attack path #4 Figure 2). 
 
a) From the secure ARM core to the non-secure IP 
This attack is a transfer of valuable data from the secure 
ARM core to the non-secure block IP. It uses a malicious 
code inserted in the driver of the DVFS frequency regulator 
as the intruder process, and the non-secure IP block as the 
receiver process. 
The intruder process controls two of the four clocks that 
feed the Programmable Logic logical gates. All four clocks 
are limited to 250 MHz, and, to save energy, can only be 
activated for some clock cycles. The malicious code uses this 
activation characteristic to transfer data. To send a logical 1, 
it activates the first controlled clock for 10 cycles, and for a 
logical 0, it activates the clock for 5 cycles. Between two 
successive bits, the clock is off for a period that is 
proportional to the size of the code between the activation of 
two clock cycles. There is no constraint on choosing the 
number of clock cycles to activate. For example, the attacker 
can choose 3 clock cycles to send a logical 1, and 2 clock 
cycles to send a logical 0. The malicious code controls the 
second clock by changing it to the same frequency as the first 
source in order to help the block IP decode the received data. 
The malicious non-secure block IP is connected to the 
two clock sources, and uses them to decode the received 
data. It uses a counter that starts once the first clock is active, 
and resets once the clock stops. The counter is incremented 
with each rising edge of the first clock. Figure 5 shows an 
example of a modulated signal at the top and decoded data at 
the bottom. 
 
Fig. 5. Decoding received data 
Table I lists four configurations of the benchmark used 
and the related bandwidth. The table shows that the size of 
the bandwidth is linked to the frequency and the activation 
cycles used. For this attack, the highest bandwidth reached is 
125.106bps. 
TABLE I.  BANDWIDTH ACCORDING TO THE FREQUENCY AND 
ACTIVATION CYCLES USED 
Frequency 
(MHz) 
N° of cycles 
for a logical 1 
N° of cycles 
for a logical 0 
Bandwidth 
(106bps) 
250 10 5 50 
250 3 2 125 
100 10 5 20 
100 3 2 50 
 
a) From secure IP to non-secure ARM core 
The last attack uses a malicious modification of the 
secure IP as the intruder process, and a code inserted in the 
general operating system as the receiver process. In [7], 
Benhani et al. present an example of this type of malicious 
block IP. 
In this attack, the receiver process uses algorithm 3. The 
intruder process uses the direct memory access capability to 
modify the register related to the ARM core clocks. The 
malicious block IP does not know how the general operating 
system is mapped but by manipulating the clock connected 
to the ARM core, it can nevertheless transfer sensitive 
information. The intruder process uses the same method as 
the intruder process described in the second attack to send 
the data. 
 
Algorithm 3: Decoding data 
Input: received_data_size 
Output: stolen_data 
for i = received_data_size to 0 do 
            loop for Tempo_sampling; 
            last_freq = new_freq; 
            new_freq = read(actuel_CPU_freq); 
if (last_freq = freq_1 and new_freq = freq_2) then 
stolen_data[i]= ‘1’; 
end if; 
if (last_freq = freq_2 and new_freq = freq_1) then 
stolen_data[i]= ‘0’; 
end if; 
end for; 
return stolen_data; 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, despite the security isolation provided by 
the TrustZone technology, we demonstrate the feasibility of 
using the frequency scaling used in modern SoC to enable 
covert channel transmission. The four attacks presented  here 
successfully transferred sensitive data in a TrustZone-
enabled SoC between an intruder process (secure) and a 
receiver process (non-secure) through malicious control of 
the frequency regulator. The paper also highlights the 
importance of the clock isolation in a SoC. 
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